An experiment on first-price common-value auctions with asymmetric information structures: The blessed winner
This paper studies the effect of holding private information on bidding behavior in common-value auctions. Three environments are studied. In the first, no bidder has any private information. In the second, all bidders hold private information. Lastly, we allow one bidder to hold private information when the opposing bidder does not. Our experiments reveal that bidders who are informed overbid, while uninformed bidders tend to underbid.
A decade after the 2007-2008 financial crisis, US unemployment has receded to near historic lows, economic growth has returned, and house prices are approaching their previous heights. However, in the shadow of the slow recovery, policymakers are left wondering what could have been done differently to accelerate the return to economic health and avoid years of misery and dislocation. This paper examines various outside-the-box policy interventions that could have prevented or mitigated much [...]
To offset the environmental impacts of products made from expanded polystyrene (also known as plastic foam or Styrofoam), a number of municipalities have considered or implemented bans of these consumer products. This paper examines the environmental and economic impacts of these bans relative to other comparable replacement products.